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THE ECONOMICS OF THE SWEDISH WELFARE STATE: PARADISE LOST?
Hans Brems
ABSTRACT
The paper examines some of the economic problems of a modern
welfare state:
Wage pressure may generate non-Keynesian unemployment.
Keynesian policies applied to non-Keynesian unemployment may
generate inflation. Very narrow wage differentials may extinguish
the signals a market is trying to send, keep wage earners from
heeding them, and generate short-run misallocation. Long-run
incentives to acquire skill and education may be destroyed.
Very high marginal income-tax rates may distort the choice
between leisure and work and the choice between consumption and
saving. Very large government-budget deficits may generate
domestic crowding-out or foreign indebtedness. Either way the
future is being sacrificed for the present; the economy is
living beyond its means.
Successive devaluations may offer short-run relief but
make long-run stabilization harder.
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THE ECONOMICS OF THE SWEDISH WELFARE STATE: PARADISE LOST?
Schumpeterian Sweden
Schumpeterian capitalist development was propelled by the innovating
oligopolists. In that sense Swedish industrial history is Schumpe-
terian: brilliant in engineering and efficient as organizers, a
small number of innovators founded corporations like Ericsson (1876),
ASEA (1883), and SKF (1907). They were so successful that Sweden
was soon too small for them: the twenty largest Swedish multinatio-
nals have as many employees outside Sweden as inside. SKF is the
In the fall of 1987 BREMS of the University of Illinois lectured
at the universities of Gothenburg, Stockholm, and Uppsala. In
sorting out his impressions of the Swedish economy he has benefited
from both the Brookings report edited by Barry Bosworth and Alice
Rivlin and the Swedish comments on it edited by Hans Sdderstrbm.
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world's largest ball-bearing manufacturer, larger than Timken.
But Swedish history is Schumpeterian in another sense: Schum-
peter believed that the very efficiency of capitalism would make
room for the welfare state and, perhaps, eventually for socialism.
The fifties and sixties were the heyday of what became known as
"the Swedish model". The model was a teamwork of industry, labor,
and government.
Industry responded to relentless wage pressure by designing
ever better new vintages of capital goods and retiring old ones
sooner. Unions cooperated by favoring new technology, by refusing
to accept interfirm or interindustry wage differentials, and by
keeping up the wage pressure. The government cooperated by sub-
sidizing geographical mobility, thus helping to resettle labor
released from old vintages, old firms, or old industries. The
government also absorbed released labor by expanding the public
sector in the form of better health care, better education, and
larger transfer payments but—for forty-four years of labor go-
vernment—never in the form of nationalization of industry.
All good things come to an end, and so did the Swedish
model. The ever larger public sector superimposed on an ever
smaller manufacturing sector made the Swedish economy vulner-
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able to oil shocks and Japanese competition in shipbuilding and
steel. Nowhere in the OECD countries was the decline of industrial
production after 1974 as protracted as in Sweden: the other coun-
tries surpassed their 1974 level by 1977, Sweden not until 1980.
Part of the reason why the transformation signals went unheeded
for so long was that the new nonlabor government coming to power
in 1976 tried to save jobs by bailout schemes in the form of
massive subsidies or outright nationalization.
By the eighties Sweden had double-digit inflation, a cen-
tral-government deficit of 14 percent of gross national product,
and a foreign debt of 20 percent of gross national product. Labor
came back to power and started a new deal. The Brookings report
and the Swedish comments on it (see For Further Reading) will
help us see some of the problems of such a new deal.
The key to labor's economic and social program is equality or,
as Swedes say, jamlikhet. The proper place to begin with jamlikhet
is the labor market.
The Labor Market
9/10 of the Swedish labor market is unionized—versus 1/5 of the
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U.S. labor market. Whether employed by the government or by private
industry, Swedish blue-collar workers are organized in the Federation
of Labor, Landsorganisatlonen. White-collar workers have their own
federation, Tj'anstemannens Centralorganlsatlon. On the Other side
of the bargaining table is government or, in private industry, the
Federation of Employers, Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen—without
counterpart in the United States.
Swedish unions must be the world's most powerful. How have
they used their power?
Current doctrine of a "natural" rate of unemployment suggests
that successful unions will establish a real wage rate which is
too high in the sense that at that rate supply will exceed demand.
The excess supply, called the "natural" rate of unemployment, is
acceptable to labor in the sense that it will not push the real
wage rate down.
Being acceptable to labor, such "natural" unemployment is
voluntary, hence not Keynesian in its nature. Still, well-meaning
government may try to apply Keynesian policies to it, say by acce-
lerating the growth of the money supply, thus stimulating demand.
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Let prices respond more readily than the money wage rate. Then
firms will experience a deceleration of the real wage rate, tempo-
rarily reducing the actual rate of unemployment below its "natural"
rate. But at the next round of collective bargaining, labor will
restore the original real wage rate and with it, the "natural"
rate of unemployment. The government has failed. Repeated attempts
to apply Keynesian instruments to non-Keynesian unemployment will
also fail: instead of a long-run reduction of unemployment, they
merely generate successive rounds of inflation.
So far we have discussed the abstraction of an overall wage
rate. Behind it we find the reality of specific wage differentials.
Pursuing their goal of equality, their jamlikhet, unions have also
used their power to reduce wage different!' als--all sorts of wage
differentials: between government and industry, between industries,
between firms in the same industry, between skilled and unskilled,
and between male and female labor. Such reduction of wage differ-
entials raises problems.
Economists know that in the short run such interference with
the market mechanism will generate excess demand for labor priced
too low. Excess demand has manifested itself in wage drift. Eco-
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mists also know that interference will generate excess supply of
labor priced too high. Excess supply has manifested itself in
a chronic unemployment of youngsters and oldsters alike. Such
chronic unemployment has been disguised by removing both groups
from the labor market, the youngsters by training schemes and pub-
lic works, the oldsters by premature pensioning. Finally econo-
mists know that in the long run wage differentials too narrow to
reflect differences in skill and education will reduce the incen-
tives to acquire such skill and education. Both for Sweden and
the United States the Brookings report found a significant and
positive rate of return on education but found the Swedish rate
to be lower than the U.S. rate.
An important wage differential is the differential between
government and industry, so let us take a closer look at govern-
ment as an employer. Government produces public goods, and public
goods are not distributed via a market but are produced according
to the law and made available at zero price to qualified recipi-
ents. In 1985 Swedish government proper produced 21 percent of gross
national product: Swedish defense, police, hospitals, schools, uni-
versities function according to the law. A lengthy labor conflict
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would seriously disrupt a flow of public goods the government
is committed to deliver and the recipients expect and depend on.
Furthermore, in producing its 21 percent of the gross national product
the government employs 25 percent of the electorate. A labor conflict,
then, would be pitting politicians against 25 percent of their voters!
As a result of all this the government finds it hard to
resist wage demands—harder than does private industry. Rational
unions should follow the path of least resistance and bargain
first with government, next with industry—asking for matching
increases. Until 1975 industry traditionally opened collective
bargaining. But after 1975 the rapidly growing public sector
has occasionally assumed the role of a wage leader.
We shall understand the role of government as a wage leader
even better when we look into wage differentials within govern-
ment: government wage differentials are traditionally narrower
than private ones. At the top end of the scale the highest-paid
government employees are paid less than the highest-paid private
ones. As a result government finds it difficult to keep its best
computer experts, tax experts, professors, or airforce pilots.
At the opposite end of the scale the lowest-paid government em-
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ployees are paid more than the lowest-paid private ones. As
a result the private sector finds it difficult to keep skilled
blue-collar workers. Pursuing their equality, their j'imlikhet,
unions will then try to make the private wage rate match the
public one. Again the public sector becomes a wage leader.
Big Government is much more than an employer.
Government Consumption, Investment, Transfer and Interest Payments
In 1985 Swedish government proper (not including government
enterprises such as railroads) produced 21 percent of gross
national product but disposed of 34 percent of it in the form of
government consumption and investment: government consumed and
invested not only its own output but also that of private industry
supplying, on the consumption side, food for school lunches and
toys for day-care centers and building, on the investment side,
schools, hospitals, highways, and defense installations.
Transfer payments are the hallmark of a welfare state. In
1986 Swedish government proper (including the social-security
system) distributed transfer payments amounting to 25 percent
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of gross national product.
Some Swedish transfer payments have (less generous) U.S.
counterparts such as unemployment and social-security benefits.
But other categories have no U.S. counterparts: Swedish parents,
for example, are entitled to a 12-month maternity-paternity
leave with government-financed pay; man and wife share the
leave as they prefer. A large network of government-financed
day-care centers provides labor-intensive care: two trained
adults for every five children under three. The government pays
family allowances for each child under sixteen, rising steeply
with family size.
j'amlikhet of income distribution may be measured graphically by
a Lorenz curve: on the horizontal axis arrange households according
to income, beginning with the poorest households. The vertical axis
shows the percent of household income earned by the poorest x percent
of households shown on the horizontal axis. If all households had
the same income the Lorenz curve would be a diagonal: x per-
cent of the households would earn x percent of household income.
Our diagram shows Lorenz curves for factor income and disposable income
in Sweden, 1984. Factor income is income earned in current production.
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF SWEDISH HOUSEHOLDS IN 1984
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Disposable income is factor income plus transfer payments including
social-security benefits minus taxes including social -security pre-
miums. Our diagram shows that the poorest 20 percent of the house-
holds earn no factor income at all but do earn about 10 percent of
all household disposable income. Because of her narrow wage differ-
entials Sweden's factor-income Lorenz curve is unusually high. Be-
cause of her generous transfer payments and high taxes Sweden's
disposable- income Lorenz curve is also unusually high—lying about
halfway between a diagonal and the factor-income Lorenz curve.
Not all Swedish transfer payments go to households: in 1986
transfer payments to private industry amounted to 4 percent of
gross national product.
Interest paid by government used to be negligible. But the
budget deficits of the eighties have raised it to 4 percent of gross
national product.
In 1986 government expenditure was 67 percent of gross national
product. How is such expenditure financed? There are two ways.
Taxation
High taxation is new in Sweden. According to the Brookings report
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tax revenue has risen from 24 percent of gross national product in
1950 to 61 percent now. The marginal tax rate is 71 percent.
Such taxation will seriously distort the leisure-work
choice. Consider an employee making, say, 100 kronor per hour
and make two assumptions dear to neoclassical theory. First,
the employee will extend his leisure to the point where his
last leisure hour is just worth his take-home pay had he worked
that hour, i.e., a mere 29 kronor. Second, an employer will
hire labor to the point where the last man hired adds a product
just worth his gross pay, i.e., a full 100 kronor. If the
employee decides to spend his hour as leisure, then, the eco-
nomy is in effect giving up 100 kronor's worth of product to
give him a mere 29 kronor's worth of leisure. If leisure carried
its true and full price tag, the employee might demand less of it.
Between 1965 and 1985, when the marginal tax rate rose from 55
to 71 percent, the number of hours worked per Swedish employee aged
25-64 declined sharply: by 18 percent for men and by 25 percent
for women. In the United States the corresponding decline was
6 percent for men and women alike.
Private saving is even more discouraged than work. A
wealth tax resting on top of, but not deductible from, the in-
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come tax may easily make the marginal after-tax return on
additional private saving turn negative.
Budget Deficits
Budget deficits are also new in Sweden. The central-government de-
ficit rose from 1 percent of gross national productffo 14 percent
in 1983 but has subsided to 5.6 percent in 1985.
Budget deficits, too, will have to be financed, and
there are only two ways of financing them. Under pure money
financing of a deficit the government issues noninterest-bearing
claims upon itself called money. Here the problem is that a
larger money supply may fuel inflation. Under pure bond fi-
nancing of a deficit the government issues interest-bearing
claims upon itself called bonds and sells them in the capital
market, leaving it to future generations to service the debt.
Here the problem is that a larger bond supply may raise the
real rate of interest, thus crowding out private investment.
The Swedish government tried to avoid that effect by selling bonds
denominated in foreign currency in foreign capital markets.
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Thus it came to pass that budget deficits became part of
Sweden's foreign debt. By the early eighties such debt had
risen to 20 percent of gross national product. Because of its
foreign-currency denomination the debt in kronor would rise
in proportion to any Swedish devaluation of the krona.
That brings us to the international aspect of the Swedish
economy.
Expansive Economic Policy in A Small Open Economy
Sweden is a wery small and a very open economy: her gross
national product is a mere 3 percent of ours, but she exports
33 percent of it. The Swedish government traditionally favors an ex-
pansive economic policy, but how much scope does a yery small
and wery open economy have for such a policy?
For a starter consider the extreme case of a Sweden sur-
rounded by a world economy with which she maintains completely
free trade and capital movements and maintains a completely
fixed exchange rate. Let us boldly ignore transportation
costs and perishable commodities. Then all commodities will
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be traded internationally at prices determined by world supply
and world demand and by the monetary policy of the leading
large countries. In such an extreme case what is the scope for
an independent Swedish economic policy?
First, if Sweden tries to adopt a monetary policy more
expansive than that of the surrounding world, her nominal rate
of interest might initially fall. But under free capital move-
ments Swedish capitalists would then place their capital abroad,
and the flight of capital would make an independent Swedish
monetary policy impossible.
Second, if Sweden tries to adopt a fiscal policy more ex-
pansive than that of the surrounding world, her disposable in-
come, hence her import, might initially be growing faster than
the disposable income of the surrounding world, hence her export.
Such a trade deficit would make an independent Swedish fiscal
policy impossible.
Third, if Swedish unions try to make the Swedish money
wage rate grow faster than that of the surrounding world,
Swedish export industries would become unprofitable: their
prices would be those of the surrounding world, but their wage
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costs would be rising faster. The resulting unemployment and
trade deficit would make an independent Swedish wage policy
impossible.
Devaluation?
As the Brookings report points out, such frustration could be
relieved and the threatening unemployment and trade deficit
avoided by devaluing the krona by a rate equaling the difference
between the growth rates of the Swedish and the foreign money
wage rates. Measured in kronor, Swedish export prices would
then be growing at the rate of world-market prices plus the
rate of devaluation. The continued profitability of exports
would have been secured!
Five times in half a century, i.e., in 1931, 1949, 1977,
1981, and 1982, Sweden devalued her krona—each time except 1981
by a rate exceeding the difference between the growth rates of
the Swedish and the foreign money wage rates, thus leaving the
krona undervalued for a while. Export booms developed, but
devaluations have problems of their own.
-17-
To begin with, because of its foreign-currency denomination
foreign debt in kronor will rise in proportion to any Swedish
devaluation. Second, since Sweden taxes nominal rather than
real interest earnings, inflation will distort choices between
placements. Third, even under a fully indexed tax system infla-
tion will distort choices: adding uncertainty about domestic
inflation to the uncertainty about foreign inflation will make
firms less inclined to commit themselves to long-range projects.
Fourth, adding uncertainty about public policy to the uncertain-
ty about future prices will do the same.
For such reasons the Swedish comments on the Brookings re-
port are less tolerant of devaluation than was the report itself:
domestic inflation over and above the foreign one should be i
avoided in the first place. But that would require a nonaccommo-
dating public policy leaving the parties of collective bargaining
fully responsible for the money wage rate. Such a nonaccommodating
policy would become less credible with each new devaluation. The
parties will remember the frequency and magnitude of the 1977, 1981
and 1982 devaluations and will count on the government to bail them
out. New rounds of domestic inflation will result.
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A New Deal?
The massive devaluations of 1981 and 1982 were considered
a new deal, and since then Sweden has had tail wind. The inter-
national upswing, the lower price of oil, and the lower dollar
have lowered inflation to four percent and helped turn the trade
deficit into a surplus.
But Sweden is not out of the woods yet. The other deficit,
the central -government deficit, was still 5.6 percent of gross
national product in 1985. One-third of the competitive edge
created by the massive devaluations has already been eaten up
by domestic money-wage increases over and above foreign ones.
Monetary and fiscal policy declarations are still ambiguous.
No tax reform has been enacted.
Conclusion
Among advanced capitalist economies Sweden has the most union-
ized labor market, the largest public sector, and the most equal
disposable- income distribution. We have examined some of the
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problems of a modern welfare state:
Wage pressure may generate non-Keynesian unemployment.
Keynesian policies applied to non-Keynesian unemployment may
generate inflation. Very narrow wage differentials may extinguish
the signals a market is trying to send, keep wage earners from
heeding them, and generate short-run mi sal location. Long-run
incentives to acquire skill and education may be destroyed.
Very high marginal income-tax rates may distort the choice
between leisure and work and the choice between consumption and
saving. Mery large government-budget deficits may generate
domestic crowding-out or foreign indebtedness. Either way the
future is being sacrificed for the present; the economy is
living beyond its means.
Successive devaluations may offer short-run relief but
make long-run stabilization harder.
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